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Two experiments were conducted to advance our understanding of the effects 
of forewarning on persuasion. In Experiment 1, personal involvement, warning 
of message content, and distraction during the forewarning-message interval were 
manipulated. The results indicated that if warned subjects were personally involved 
with the attitude issue, they became resistant to the persuasive appeal when they 
were not cognitively distracted after warning. In contrast, when subjects were not 
personally involved, they were susceptible to the appeal regardless of levels of 
warning and distraction. In Experiment 2 manipulation of message strength was 
added to the three factors of Experiment 1. The results revealed that subjects in 
high involvement conditions were better able to differentiate the strength of the 
message (i.e., rate the strong message to be more persuasive than the weak one) 
than those in low involvement conditions; however, this was true only when the 
subjects were unwarned, or were warned but distracted. When warning was not 
followed by distraction, the subjects in high involvement conditions showed re- 
sistance to the strong message as well as the weak one. In low involvement 
conditions subjects were more persuaded in general, but when the warned were 
not distracted, they seemed to agree more with the strong message than with the 
weak one. Measurements of postmessage thoughts in both experiments indicated 
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that subjects who showed resistance to the persuasive appeal generated more 
negative thoughts and fewer positive thoughts, compared with persuaded subjects. 
The results of the two experiments suggested that personal involvement mediates 
warned subjects’ cognitive responding, and when message recipients are highly 
involved in a counter-attitudinal communication, warning of message content may 
trigger cognitive defending, which directs them to process the subsequent message 
in a relatively biased way, thus increasing resistance to persuasion. Results were 
discussed in the light of cognitive response approaches to persuasion (e.g., Chai- 
ken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo. 1986). o IWZ Academic PRSS, IIIC. 
As persuasion researchers have recognized, forewarning is a complex 
phenomenon. The history of work on forewarning now dates back more 
than 25 years, and although we have learned much, some issues regarding 
effects and processes surrounding forewarning remain unsettled. Beyond 
specific concerns for forewarning itself, the complexity of forewarning 
situations guarantees that such situations will be rich in the empirical 
possibilities they provide persuasion researchers and theorists. The non- 
forewarned conditions of forewarning experiments are basic persuasion 
experiments. Then, the forewarning conditions offer additional motiva- 
tional and information processing contexts that may contribute to our 
overall understanding of persuasion. In this paper we report on two ex- 
periments in which we examine some specific processes and effects of 
forewarning of content. We also consider what our findings offer to theory 
development/refinement, with particular reference to current cognitive- 
motivational models of persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Chaiken, 
1980, 1987; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989). 
The Counterargumentation Hypothesis 
Generally speaking, for example, in undergraduate social psychology 
textbooks, forewarning is presented as a factor that produces resistance 
to persuasion. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) and earlier, Apsler and Sears 
(1968) and Papageorgis (1968)) have distinguished between forewarning 
of intent to persuade versus forewarning of the content of the appeal. In 
the former case, subjects know only that a persuasion attempt is imminent. 
They do not know what the communicator will say, or which side of the 
issue the communicator represents. In these instances, it is often assumed 
that reactance causes message recipients to generate arguments that bol- 
ster their own position, and there is some evidence for this (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1979). 
Forewarning of content is more subtle and is perhaps closer to most 
naturally occurring forewarning situations. Recipients know that a message 
is imminent, and they know roughly or specifically what might be said. 
Studies have often, but not always, shown that subjects warned in this 
manner are better able to resist the persuasive appeal of the message than 
unwarned subjects. Some researchers have proposed that it is not the 
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forewarning per se that produces resistance to persuasion, but rather that 
warned subjects take advantage of the temporal delay preceding exposure 
to the persuasive message to engage in cognitive counterargumentation. 
According to this counterargumentation hypothesis, warned subjects are 
motivated by the warning to consider arguments supporting their own 
position and refuting antagonistic positions during the temporal delay 
period; thus, they become more resistant to the subsequent appeal than 
unwarned subjects. Indirect supportive evidence comes from Freedman 
and Sears (1965) and Hass and Grady (1975), who demonstrated that as 
the forewarning-message delay was made longer, resistance to a message 
increased. Additionally, Brock (1967) found that as forewarnings sug- 
gested increasingly discrepant messages, the number of counterarguments 
subjects generated increased. 
In a more extensive test of the counterargumentation hypothesis, Petty 
and Cacioppo (1977), after a warning manipulation and before exposure 
to the message, instructed both unwarned and warned subjects to write 
down either thoughts that naturally occurred to them (actual thoughts) 
or specific thoughts regarding the topic of the appeal (topic thoughts). 
The results showed that the warned subjects in actual-thoughts conditions 
engaged in counterargumentation preceding message exposure. The au- 
thors also showed that the unwarned subjects in topic-thoughts conditions 
were as resistant as the warned subjects to the subsequent appeal. Petty 
and Cacioppo interpreted their results as consistent with the counterar- 
gumentation hypothesis: Directed thought-listing regarding the persuasion 
topic safeguarded the unwarned subjects from the appeal; the warned 
subjects were safeguarded by their own cognitive defending, as shown in 
actual-thoughts conditions. 
The thought-listing procedure, however, has been criticized for eliciting 
listings of thoughts that would not have occurred without the instruction 
to list thoughts (Miller & Baron, 1973). Although forewarned subjects in 
Petty and Cacioppo’s (1977) study listed more counterarguments in the 
“actual-thoughts” condition than subjects who were not forewarned, this 
may have been because forewarning made knowledge about the topic 
more available. This greater availability, when combined with demand 
characteristics of the thought-listing procedure, may have produced the 
counterarguments. Moreover, the very act of listing thoughts may have 
caused more resistance to the appeal than would occur in a naturalistic 
response to forewarning. For instance, it has been found that people who 
state or write down their opinions before being exposed to the opinions 
of others are less likely to make subsequent conforming judgments (Kies- 
ler, 1971; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). The act of writing down topic-relevant 
thoughts prior to being exposed to a message may produce similar re- 
sistance in persuasion settings by increasing the commitment to a preex- 
isting attitude. 
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Distraction has been useful in helping confirm that pivotal role of cog- 
nitive responding in other persuasion settings (e.g., Festinger & Maccoby, 
1964; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976; Harkins & Petty, 1981). A mere 
temporal delay, without access to refutational arguments, is unlikely to 
help warned subjects resist the persuasive appeal. When counterargu- 
mentation stimulated by a warning of message content is prevented by 
distraction, a warned subject should be less able to generate counterar- 
guments and should therefore be less resistant to the appeal, compared 
with a warned but undistracted subject. In the present study, distraction 
during the delay between forewarning of content and message presentation 
was used to provide a stronger, more direct test of the counterargumen- 
tation hypothesis. 
The distraction effect in the present study hinges on an assumption that 
warned recipients diligently engage in counterargumentation; thus, the 
distraction effect should not exist if the warned subjects are not motivated 
to counterargue prior to message exposure. There are findings that show 
that personal involvement may moderate warning effects (e.g., Apsler & 
Sears, 1968; Cialdini, Levy, Herman, Kozlowski, & Petty, 1976). This 
suggests that personal involvement in the topic issue should be another 
factor to be considered to make our test of the counterargumentation 
hypothesis more complete: A warned person’s resistance to a subsequent 
persuasive appeal may be evident only when the topic of the impending 
message is important or involving. It follows that cognitive distraction 
after warning should be important as a disrupter of counterargumentation 
only when warned subjects are involved and motivated to defend their 
positions on the issue. 
Although, as we mentioned earlier, warning of message content is typ- 
ically associated with resistance to a persuasive appeal, some research has 
shown that warned recipients can also become more susceptible to the 
appeal (e.g., Cooper & Jones, 1970; Mills & Aronson, 1965). Message 
recipients sometimes generate arguments consistent with a counteratti- 
tudinal message. McGuire (1985; McGuire & Millman, 1965) has called 
this “anticipatory change.” He reasoned that message recipients, expecting 
to be influenced, attempt to maintain self-esteem (i.e., avoid the ap- 
pearance of being persuasible) by an immediate attitude shift in the di- 
rection of the coming message, making it appear that they have held the 
advocated position all along, or were moving in that direction. Cacioppo 
and Petty (1979) have outlined this and other attempts to explain sus- 
ceptibility. They have recently concluded, however, in Petty and Cacioppo 
(1990), that where susceptibility is found, it can usually be accounted for 
by either low involvement, because intensity of cognitive processing is 
low, or high involvement in interaction with other variables that produce 
a proattitudinal processing bias (e.g., strong rather than weak arguments). 
We will have more to say about susceptibility later in this introduction. 
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Cognitive Elaboration Models 
Current cognitive elaboration models of attitude change [Chaiken’s heu- 
ristic-systematic model, HSM; Chaiken et al., (1989) and Petty & Ca- 
cioppo’s (1986) elaboration likelihood model, ELM] offer a good frame- 
work within which to consider the effects of forewarning. Following 
current trends in cognitive psychology and social cognition, these models 
hold that issue-relevant processing can be based on simple situational 
“peripheral” cues or heuristics, or that it can be more “central” or sys- 
tematic (i.e., involve more elaboration.) Systematic, elaborative process- 
ing requires cognitive effort and occupies cognitive capacity. It can be 
negatively affected by individual differences (e.g., extent of issue-relevant 
personal knowledge) and situational variables (e.g., distraction). In this 
more elaborative processing, the processor accesses and scrutinizes in- 
formation that may be relevant and important to an attitude judgment. 
Thus message arguments are evaluated carefully and methodically, al- 
though not necessarily in an unbiased fashion. Personal knowledge and 
personal motivations may bias systematic processing and influence inter- 
pretation of message arguments. 
On the other hand, heuristic or peripheral processing is less effortful 
and occupies less cognitive capacity. Recipients make judgmental decisions 
based on simple inferential rules or situational cues (e.g., experts know 
what they are talking about; if most people hold a particular position, it 
must be correct; a person in a lab coat must know what he or she is 
talking about; etc.). This kind of processing is more schematic in that it 
more extensively involves the instantiation of existing organized knowl- 
edge structures. Decisions are made quickly and efficiently, with little 
absorption of the semantic content of the message. This use of schemata 
may occur with or without awareness. 
An important assumption of cognitive models is that we are motivated 
to hold valid, accurate (congruent with facts) attitudes. Elaborative and 
heuristic processing are called on in the service of maximizing confidence 
in the validity of our attitudes. Because heuristic processing is less ef- 
fortful, it will be engaged as long as confidence in validity of attitudes is 
lacking, as long as heuristic cues are available, and when recipients are 
unmotivated or unable to engage in systematic processing. Systematic 
processing may be engaged when recipients believe that heuristics will 
not lead to a sufficient increase in confidence in one’s attitude. For ex- 
ample, when an issue is high in personal relevance, presumably recipients 
are unlikely to feel that sufficient confidence can be attained with simple 
decision rules. 
Elaborative and heuristic-peripheral processing can co-occur and can 
have attenuative, additive, or interactive effects on persuasion. For ex- 
ample, the effects of systematic processing may override that based on 
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peripheral cues (the attenuation hypothesis) when motivation to process 
systematically and ability to do so are high. Heuristic processing may bias 
elaborative processing by influencing judgments about the credibility of 
the message. Elaborative and heuristic processing can operate indepen- 
dently of each other. Finally, heuristics may themselves motivate elabo- 
ration. In earlier studies, for example, we manipulated forewarning, sub- 
ject knowledge, and expertise of the communicator (Chen & Reardon, 
1987). The results of that study were not unequivocal, but showed that 
a heuristic cue (in this case, expertise of the communicator) not only can 
lead to greater persuasion, as indicated by attitude scales, but also can 
spur cognitive activity even among low knowledge subjects. 
Overview of Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we manipulated forewarning, distraction during the 
forewarning-message presentation interval, and involvement. These have 
been manipulated previously, but never in the same design (e.g., fore- 
warning and distraction, without cognitive responses, in Apsler & Sears, 
1968; and forewarning and involvement, but within the ‘intent to persuade’ 
paradigm, in Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). When subjects are forewarned, 
involved, and not distracted, they should generate counterattitudinal ar- 
guments and should thus be more resistant to the impending appeal. 
Distraction should interfere with counterargumentation, rendering the 
recipients more susceptible to the appeal. When they are not involved, 
forewarning and distraction should have minimal impact, because moti- 
vation to counterargue is low. Persuasion may be less for high involve- 
ment-forewarned-undistracted subjects, but greater for high involve- 
ment forewarned-distracted subjects. An alternative pattern for low 
involvement conditions, also consistent with cognitive models, might oc- 
cur, for example, if forewarning itself acts as a heuristic. We might find 
that it produces susceptibility in the low involvement conditions; it might 
also stimulate cognitive activity. 
Method 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Subjects. The subjects were 86 undergraduates from the University of Oklahoma who 
participated as one option of a research familiarization requirement. 
Design. The design was a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial with two levels of involvement (high and 
low), two levels of distraction (distracted and undistracted), and two levels of warning 
(warned and unwarned). 
Procedure. The subjects were tested in small groups of up to 10. These groups were 
homogeneous with respect to the distraction variable; however, within sessions, subjects 
were randomly assigned to warning and involvement conditions. Stimulus materials were 
presented in the form of a booklet. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were told 
that the experiment was actually a survey, and that their responses would be anonymous. 
They were asked not to communicate with any of the other participants and not to open 
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their booklets or turn a page of the booklets until instructed to do so by the experimenter. 
In a procedure similar to that used by Petty and colleagues (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) 
subjects then were told that the Psychology Department was cooperating with the University 
in doing a survey about students’ opinions on an important issue. They were told that their 
opinions would be carefully considered by the University, and that a final decision on the 
issue would be aided by their responses.’ 
Warning induction. On the first page, subjects in warned groups were informed that the 
University was considering the adoption of a new policy that required senior students to 
take a comprehensive exam in their declared major. A satisfactory passing grade exam 
would be required for graduation. Subjects in unwarned groups were only informed that 
the University was considering adoption of a new policy on evaluation of students’ academic 
performance. 
Manipulation of personal involvement. On the same page, subjects in high personal in- 
volvement conditions read that the policy, if adopted, would be effective immediately, so 
it would affect most students then at the University. Subjects in low personal involvement 
conditions were informed that the policy would not affect anyone, because even if adopted, 
it would not be effective until the 1995 school year (the study was conducted in 1988). All 
subjects then were asked to listen to an audiotape of a faculty member advocating the 
adoption of the policy. 
Distraction task. Immediately after the warning and involvement manipulations, subjects 
in distraction conditions were instructed to complete a distraction task. This task consisted 
of completing a series of verbal and arithmetic “progressions;” in our many uses of it, the 
task has proven to be quite involving. Subjects in undistracted conditions were told to do 
nothing but sit quietly. Three minutes passed. During this interval, the experimenter set 
up an audio tape recorder. 
Message. All subjects heard a message, which lasted about 3 minutes, immediately after 
the distraction manipulation. In the message, a male speaker identified himself as a faculty 
member in the College of Education and a member of a faculty committee on Academic 
Affairs. The speaker went on to note declining trends in academic performance and successful 
job placements. The Committee, the faculty member reported, was considering the senior 
exams as a possible solution to the problem. The arguments (inspired by, and partially 
adapted from Petty & Cacioppo, 1977) given for the exams can be paraphrased as follows: 
(a) students will spend more time on coursework because they know that they will have to 
retain it past the end of a semester; (b) top companies will come to recruit employees 
because they will have some quality assurance; (c) data show that starting salaries of students 
who come from schools with the exams are higher than those from schools that do not have 
the exams; (d) prestige graduate and professional programs prefer students from schools 
that have comprehensive exams; (e) faculty members who took such exams found them 
very helpful; (f) institution of exams might make a political impression on legislators con- 
cerned with standards or quality, leading to increases in appropriations. The speaker ended 
his talk with a short summary statement of the arguments.* 
Dependent measures. Immediately after listening to the message, all subjects were asked 
to turn to the next page in their booklet and respond to three questions: (1) “To what 
extent do you agree with the recorded message on the adoption of senior comprehensive 
exams at OU?” (2) “What is your position on the adoption of the exams?” (3) “The 
recorded message was very persuasive.” All responses were made on 9-point Likert-format 
’ This cover story may have, itself, stimulated some involvement in the issue and task. 
However, as the data eventually confirmed, the cover story only produced a minimum 
platform of involvement upon which the involvement manipulation could be added. 
* Transcripts of the complete texts of the statements for both experiments are available 
from either of the first two authors. 
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Warned Unwarned 
FIG. 1. Experiment 1: Mean responses to attitude scale measures. (m) Distracted/high, 
(0) distracted/low, (0) undistracted/high, (0) undistracted/low. 
scales, where 1 indicated “strongly disagree,” and 9 indicated “strongly agree.” All subjects 
then were instructed to turn to the last page of their booklets. Using a typical cognitive 
response procedure (Brock, 1967; Greenwald, 1968; Petty et al., 1976), subjects were given 
3 min to engage in thought-listing. 
Results 
Six subjects were excluded from analyses because they failed to follow 
instructions (e.g., failed to respond to an item or items). A 2 x 2 x 2 
(warning x distraction x involvement) analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was performed on the attitude scale measures using the remaining 80 
subjects (10 subjects per cell). 
Attitude scale meawe. The three attitude scales showed similar patterns 
of results and were highly correlated with each other. A coefficient (Y of 
.89 was obtained, suggesting that the three scales constitute a single co- 
herent measure. Thus, a single attitude scale variable was created by 
summing the scale and dividing by three, across subjects. The means for 
each cell using this measure are presented in Fig. 1. The ANOVA revealed 
several significant effects. There were two main effects: Distracted subjects 
were less resistant, compared with the undistracted, to the persuasive 
communication, F(1, 72) = 13.40, p < .OOl; and, subjects in high in- 
volvement conditions showed more resistance to the message than their 
low involvement counterparts, F(1, 72) = 75.08, p < ,001. The following 
two-way interactions were also found: Distraction x warning, F(1, 72) 
= 15.67, p < .OOl, distraction x involvement, F(1, 72) = 12.33, p < 
.OOl, and warning x involvement, F( 1, 72) = 6.45, p < .02. Specifically, 
the warning effect was elevated in undistracted conditions as well as in 
high involvement conditions, and distraction had more impact on high 
involvement subjects than low involvement subjects. The three-way in- 
teraction of distraction x warning x involvement was also significant, 
F(1, 72) = 7.64, p < .Ol. Figure 1 shows that when subjects were not 
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Positive Thoughts Negative Thoughts 
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WPl?Nd Unwarned WMlWd Unwarned 
FIG. 2. Experiment 1: Mean positive and negative thoughts. (m) Distracted/high, 
distracted/low, (0) undistracted/high, (0) undistracted/low. 
(.I 
personally involved, neither distraction nor warning had significant impact 
on their resistance to the persuasive appeal. In contrast, highly involved 
subjects were more likely to resist the appeal, especially when they were 
not distracted following the warning of the message contents (warned high 
involvement-distracted M = 6.10, vs warned high involvement-undis- 
tracted M = 3.00; p < .Ol, Tukey HSD critical value = 1.64). 
Thought listing. The subjects’ postmessage thoughts and ratings were 
evaluated by two naive judges. The judges agreed on 99% of subjects’ 
classifications. Figure 2 shows the means of negative and positive thoughts 
in various conditions. 
The results of an ANOVA on positive thoughts showed that subjects 
in low involvement conditions (M = 2.53) had more positive thoughts 
than those in high involvement conditions (M = 1.30), F(1, 72) = 7.87, 
p < .Ol. A two-way interaction, warning x involvement, indicated that 
involved subjects had fewer positive thoughts, compared with the unin- 
volved subjects, especially in warned conditions, F(1, 72) = 7.24, p < 
.Ol (warned low involvement M = 3.10, vs warned high involvement 
M = .70; p < .Ol, Tukey HSD critical value = 1.97). 
The results for negative thoughts indicated that involved subjects (M = 
1.30) generated more negative thoughts than their uninvolved counterparts 
(M = .28), F(1, 72) = 20.53, p < .OOl. A two-way interaction of dis- 
traction x warning showed that warned subjects had more negative 
thoughts if they were not distracted, F(1, 72) = 6.46, p < .02. Another 
two-way interaction was found for distraction x involvement, F(1, 72) 
= 11.74, p < .Ol. Involved subjects showed more negative thoughts, 
compared with the uninvolved, only when they were not distracted. A 
three-way interaction of distraction x warning x involvement, F(1, 72) 
= 5.39, p < .03, revealed that subjects in high involvement conditions 
had more negative thoughts than those in low involvement conditions, 
especially when they were not distracted after forewarning (warned high 
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involvement-undistracted M = 2.80, vs warned high involvement-dis- 
tracted M = SO; warned high involvement-undistracted M = 2.80, vs 
unwarned high involvement-undistracted M = 1.00; p < .Ol, Tukey HSD 
critical value = 1.64). 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 provide support for the counterargumen- 
tation hypothesis. Forewarning under conditions of high involvement pro- 
duced resistance when subjects were able to develop counterarguments 
to the anticipated message (i.e., undistracted subjects). High involvement 
subjects who were distracted between warning and message, and who 
were thus unable to develop counterarguments, were less resistant and 
were persuaded to the same degree as those subjects were not forewarned. 
The thought-listing data in high involvement conditions clearly show the 
expected levels and directions of cognitive activity. In warned-undistracted 
conditions, there are virtually no positive thoughts, but many negative 
thoughts. Warned-distracted and unwarned-distracted subjects showed ap- 
proximately the same pattern of activity, with positive thoughts outnum- 
bering negative thoughts by about the same amount. 
Let us consider now the results from low involvement conditions. In 
low involvement conditions, message recipients presumably use persuasion 
heuristics. In this case, some heuristic (e.g., expertise is one possibility; 
Chaiken et al., 1989) apparently resulted in a level of confidence in attitude 
that was well above sufficiency criteria. The attitude scale measures in- 
dicate that low involvement subjects were susceptible to the persuasive 
appeal in all conditions, and in all conditions, they were more persuaded 
than high involvement subjects. The thought-listing data show a differ- 
ential impact of the independent variables. First, distraction seems to have 
generally interfered with cognitive activity: Fewer positive thoughts were 
listed when subjects were distracted. Also, warned subjects produced more 
positive thoughts than unwarned subjects, at both levels of distraction. 
Overall, however, variations in cognitive activity did not add anything to 
already confident opinions. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Under conditions of high involvement, central route or systematic pro- 
cessing of issue-relevant arguments may increase subsequent agreement 
with the message. However, highly involved subjects who have been 
forewarned and not distracted might not exhibit this effect because they 
have prepared counterarguments. A sufficient level of confidence in one’s 
judgment may have already been reached through the anticipation of 
arguments and counterarguments. 
Messages containing weak arguments generally result in less persuasion 
when elaborative processing occurs than that found under conditions of 
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low involvement when heuristic processing occurs and weak arguments 
do not have an influence. However, the recent meta-analysis by Johnson 
and Eagly (1989) found that differences in persuasion resulting from the 
processing of weak arguments under high and low involvement conditions 
are not reliably found. It was suggested by Johnson and Eagly that under 
conditions of high involvement, weak arguments provide inadequate in- 
formation to reach a criteria of sufficient confidence in one’s attitude. In 
such cases, one’s attitude is likely to remain the same as it was before 
exposure to the message instead of becoming more negative. Crossing 
argument strength and involvement with forewarning may help to clarify 
this process by providing an alternative means of attainment of sufficient 
confidence through forewarning and counterargumentation. To the three 
factors of Experiment 1, we added a message strength variable. 
Method 
Manipulation of message strength. In developing the arguments for the message, 60 dif- 
ferent members from the same subject population as Experiment 1 were recruited. After 
a brief explanation of “senior comprehensive exams,” the students were instructed to pretend 
to favor the adoption of the requirement for graduation and to generate, individually, various 
plausible reasons why the senior comprehensive exams should be instituted at the University. 
Thirty 7-inch horizontal lines, each about .7 inch from the one above, created 15 boxes in 
which subjects were to write their reasons. This task was conducted in three separate sessions, 
with 10 subjects in each session. Subjects were encouraged to generate as many reasons as 
possible in 10 min. The remaining 30 subjects were presented with the generated arguments 
and were asked to rate them for strength. The ratings ranged from 1 (least convincing) to 
9 (most convincing). Based on these ratings, arguments with high ratings were selected to 
constitute a strong message advocating the requirement of senior comprehensive exams; 
while arguments with low ratings were selected to constitute a weak message advocating 
the adoption of the policy. Each of the messages was about 450 words and about 3 min 
long on audiotape. Another set of 10 subjects were used to test the persuasiveness of the 
two versions of message on a 9-point Likert-format scale, where 1 indicated “not persuasive 
at all,” and 9 indicated “very persuasive.” With the presenting order counterbalanced, the 
subjects’ mean ratings for the strong and weak messages were 7.40 and 3.50, respectively, 
t(9) = 1.90, p c .05. 
Subjects. The subjects were 169 undergraduates from the same pool as Experiment 1, 
who participated as one option of a research familiarization requirement. 
Design. The design was a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 factorial with two levels of involvement (high 
and low), two levels of distraction (distracted and undistracted), two levels of warning 
(warned and unwarned), and two levels of message strength (strong and weak). Subjects 
were assigned at random to 1 of the 16 conditions. 
Procedure. The procedure of Experiment 2 was virtually the same as that of Experiment 
1, except for the addition of a manipulation of message strength. Running sessions were 
homogeneous with respect to the distraction and message strength variables; within sessions, 
subjects were randomly assigned to warning and involvement conditions. The strong message 
included the arguments from Experiment 1. The subjects in weak message conditions heard 
the following arguments: (a) Comprehensive exams would encourage class attendance, and 
increased attendance would stimulate instructors; (b) the exams would ensure consistency 
of material covered/presented in courses among instructors; (c) the exams would “weed 
out” those who had been getting by through cheating; (d) the stress caused by the exams 
: et 0’ 
Warned Unwarned Warned Unanmed 
FIG. 3. Experiment 2: Mean responses to attitude scale measures. (m) Distracted/high, 
(0) distracted/low, (Cl) undistracted/high, (0) undistracted/low. 
would be useful in helping students learn how to handle stress; (e) students would be more 
likely to develop superior study skills and mnemonics if they know they will have to retain 
the material for longer; (f) the exams would attract better faculty to the University. 
Immediately after message exposure, all subjects were instructed to turn to the next page 
of their booklets and respond to the same three questions as those of Experiment 1. The 
experiment was completed when all subjects finished writing their postmessage thoughts in 
3 min. 
Results 
Data from 9 subjects were excluded from analyses because these sub- 
jects failed to follow instructions. A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 (warning x distraction 
x involvement x strength) ANOVA was performed on the three de- 
pendent variables using the remaining 160 subjects (10 subjects per cell). 
Attitude scale measure. The data from the three attitude scales were 
combined in the same way as in Experiment 1 (coefficient (Y = .95). The 
means for the resulting attitude scale measure are presented in Fig. 3. 
The ANOVA revealed several significant effects. Warned subjects were 
more resistant to the message than unwarned subjects, F(1,144) = 12.24, 
p < .OOl. The distracted were less resistant, compared with the undis- 
tracted, to the persuasive communication, F(1, 144) = 16.39, p < .OOl; 
subjects in high involvement conditions showed more resistance to the 
message than their low involvement counterparts, F(1, 144) = 281.37, 
p < .OOl, and subjects yielded more agreement to the strong message 
than to the weak one, F(1, 144) = 30.65, p < .OOl. The following two- 
way interactions were found: Distraction x warning, F(1, 144) = 17.76, 
p < .OOl; distraction x involvement, F(1, 144) = 15.51,~ < .OOl; warning 
x involvement, F(1, 144) = 9.35,~ < .Ol; and involvement x argument 
strength, F(1, 144) = 6.56, p < .02. Specifically, the warning effect was 
evident only in undistracted conditions as well as in high involvement 
conditions, and the distraction effect was significant only when the subjects 
were highly involved in the topic issue. A three-way interaction of dis- 
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traction x warning x involvement was significant, F(1, 144) = 27.10, 
p < .OOl. Figure 3 shows that, as was found in Experiment 1, when 
subjects were not personally involved, neither distraction nor warning had 
significant impact on their resistance to the message. In contrast, highly 
involved subjects were more likely to resist the appeal when they were 
not distracted following the warning of the message contents (warned high 
involvement-undistracted M = 2.67, vs warned low involvement-undis- 
tracted M = 7.05, p < .Ol, Tukey HSD critical value = 1.24). 
Finally, a four-way interaction of distraction x warning x involvement 
x strength was found, F(1, 144) = 6.85, p < .Ol. The distraction x 
warning x involvement interaction was more pronounced when the ar- 
guments were strong rather than weak: As Fig. 3 indicates, subjects in 
high involvement conditions were better able to differentiate the strength 
of the message (i.e., the strong message was more persuasive than the 
weak one) than those in low involvement conditions; however, this was 
true only when the subjects were unwarned or were warned but distracted; 
when warning was not followed by distraction, the subjects in high in- 
volvement conditions showed extreme resistance to the strong message 
as well as the weak one. In low involvement conditions subjects were 
more persuaded in general, but, interestingly, when warned subjects were 
not distracted, they seemed to agree more with the strong message than 
with the weak one (the Tukey HSD critical value, at p < .05, for dis- 
traction x warning x involvement x strength cells = 1.47; cell means 
are in Fig. 3). 
Thought listing. The subjects’ postmessage thoughts and ratings were 
evaluated by two naive judges. Thoughts were classified into three cat- 
egories: Negative thoughts (i.e., opposed to the advocated position), pos- 
itive thoughts (i.e., in favor of the advocated position), and neutral 
thoughts (i.e., unrelated thoughts or related thoughts of unspecified fa- 
vorability). The judges agreed on 98.85% of subjects’ classifications. Fig- 
ure 4 shows the means of negative and positive thoughts in various con- 
ditions. 
Analyses of variance were performed on negative and positive thoughts 
separately. The results on negative thoughts showed all the four main 
effects: The undistracted (M = 1.16) had more negative thoughts than 
the distracted (M = .74), F(1, 144) = 10.70, p < .Ol; the warned (M 
= 1.11) generated more negative thoughts than the unwarned (M = .79), 
F(1, 144) = 6.26, p < .02; compared with those in low involvement 
conditions (M = .34), subjects in high involvement conditions (M = 
1.56) showed more negative thoughts, F(1, 144) = 88.93, p < .OOl; the 
weak message (M = 1.14) drew more negative thoughts than the strong 
one (M = .76), F(1, 144) = 8.33, p < .Ol. A two-way interaction of 
distraction x warning showed that warned subjects had more negative 
thoughts if they were not distracted, F(1, 144) = 14.81, p < .OOl. Another 








Warned Unwarned Warned Unwarned 
FIG. 4. Experiment 2: Mean positive and negative thoughts. (m) Distracted/high, (0) 
distracted/low, (0) undistracted/high, (0) undistracted/low. 
two-way interaction was found in distraction x involvement, F(1, 144) 
= 33.33, p < .OOl, suggesting that high involvement subjects showed 
more negative thoughts, compared with low involvement subjects, es- 
pecially when they were not distracted. A two-way interaction of warning 
x involvement, F(1, 144) = 9.48, p < .Ol, suggested that warning caused 
more negative thoughts only in high involvement conditions. Another 
two-way interaction of strength x involvement, F(1, 144) = 7.26, p < 
.Ol, indicated that a weak message led to negative thoughts only if the 
subjects were highly involved. A three-way interaction of distraction x 
warning x involvement, F(1, 144) = 13.37, p < .OOl, revealed that 
subjects in high involvement conditions had more negative thoughts than 
those in low involvement conditions, especially when they were not dis- 
tracted after warning. 
The results of the ANOVAs on positive thoughts showed that subjects 
in low involvement conditions (M = 2.83) had more positive thoughts 
than those in high involvement conditions (M = 1.15), F(1, 144) = 70.94, 
p < .OOl. It was also found that after listening to the strong message 
(M = 2.36), subjects had more positive thoughts than those in the weak 
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message conditions (M = 1.61), p < .OOl. A two-way interaction of 
distraction x involvement indicated that, in low involvement conditions, 
the undistracted generated more positive thoughts than the distracted, 
F(1, 144) = 5.12, p < .03. A three-way interaction of distraction X 
warning x involvement suggested that in high involvement conditions, 
warned subjects had less positive thoughts if they were not distracted, 
whereas warned subjects in low involvement conditions showed more 
positive thoughts when they were not distracted, F(1, 144) = 6.97, p < 
.Ol. 
Discussion 
Again, the counterargumentation hypothesis was supported. In high 
involvement conditions, resistance to persuasion was evident when sub- 
jects were forewarned and not distracted, regardless of message strength. 
When subjects were not forewarned, and when subjects were forewarned 
but distracted, argument strength accounted for differences in suscepti- 
bility: Strong arguments led to more persuasion than weak arguments. 
The cognitive response data for high involvement conditions showed few 
positive and many negative thoughts when subjects were forewarned and 
not distracted, and weak arguments led to more negative thoughts than 
strong arguments (with no impact of strength, possibly due to floor ef- 
fects). When subjects were unwarned and undistracted, or distracted, 
argument strength accounted for all differences, with strong arguments 
producing more positive thoughts than weak arguments, and weak ar- 
guments producing more negative thoughts than strong arguments. 
In low involvement conditions, persuasion as indicated by the attitude 
scale measures was almost uniformly high; as in Experiment 1, cognitive 
responding varied as a function of the other independent variables. Few 
negative thoughts were generated, ragardless of levels of distraction, warn- 
ing, or argument strength. Generally, strong arguments led to more pos- 
itive thoughts than weak arguments, and distraction led to fewer positive 
thoughts than no distraction. Distraction led to fewer positive thoughts 
following weak arguments when subjects were warned than when subjects 
were warned and undistracted. That is, distraction seems to have had a 
negative impact on positive thought generation when low involvement 
subjects were forewarned and arguments were weak. However, as in 
Experiment 1, confidence was already sufficiently high, and, as the attitude 
scale measure shows, variations in cognitive activity did not add or detract 
from that confidence. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In both experiments, when involvement was high, and cognitive re- 
sponding was not interfered with by distraction, warned subjects were 
more resistant to the persuasive message than unwarned subjects. In 
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contrast, warning and distraction effects were not noticed in low involve- 
ment conditions. This finding provides strong support for the counter- 
argumentation hypothesis, and it also suggests that warning of an im- 
pending counterattitudinal message induces resistance to the appeal only 
when the message topic is highly involving and important to the recipients. 
Subjects in low involvement conditions were more persuaded overall 
than their high involvement counterparts. However, when low involve- 
ment subjects were forewarned and not distracted, they seemed to process 
the content of the message enough to make some discrimination of ar- 
gument strength; the strong message produced more agreement, and was 
rated more favorably than the weak one. This may be because the strong 
arguments were a closer match to the expectations created by forewarning 
than weak arguments. 
The comparisons of positive and negative thoughts allows us to verify 
subjects’ resistance to the persuasive appeal in various conditions. The 
results clearly showed that persuaded subjects tended to have more pos- 
itive thoughts after exposure to the persuasive communication than those 
who were resistant to the appeal. For example, the persuaded subjects 
in low involvement conditions showed more positive thoughts but fewer 
negative thoughts than those in high involvement conditions, where re- 
sistance to persuasion was observed. It is also important to note that in 
high involvement conditions, unwarned subjects, and warned but dis- 
tracted subjects, showed more positive thoughts and fewer negative 
thoughts than the warned but undistracted subjects. 
Petty and Cacioppo’s (1977) thought-listing method of investigating 
cognitive responding following forewarning has been criticized for not 
providing direct evidence of cognitive counterargumentation following 
forewarning because of possible demand characteristics (e.g., Miller & 
Baron, 1973; Orne, 1962). The distraction method and postmessage 
thoughts measurement employed in this study provide support for the 
counterargumentation hypothesis. 
In low involvement conditions, we found highest the levels of persuasion 
overall and the highest levels of cognitive activity. This is most consistent 
with a view that holds that an available heuristic (e.g., expertise) provided 
sufficient confidence in a favorable attitude. The heuristic may also have 
incidentally activated knowledge structures, making relevant thoughts 
available. These thoughts may not have been carefully considered at the 
time attitude scale choices were made, but they were available when 
subjects were asked to list thoughts. The available thoughts, those in the 
network activated by the heuristic, are likely to be consistent with the 
heuristic; in our case, in favor of the advocacy (thus the listing of many 
positive thoughts, and few, if any, negative thoughts). Generation, then, 
in low involvement conditions, may not be the “on-line” evaluative pro- 
cessing it is in high involvement conditions, but a process of “reading 
off” of thoughts from a recently activated network. 
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Persuasive? 
Low Inv. High Inv. 
FIG. 5. Experiment 2: Argument strength x involvement, unwarned-undistracted con- 
ditions only. (m) Strong, (0) weak. 
With respect to involvement, our pattern of results may be informative 
regarding a recent issue in the persuasion literature. Our issue was the 
same as that used by Petty and Cacioppo (1979), and would thus be 
considered to be “outcome relevant” by Johnson and Eagly (1989, 1990). 
As such, there should be little cognitive activity in low involvement con- 
ditions, or at least, little difference in cognitive activity relative to high 
involvement conditions. That there was a great deal of cognitive activity 
suggests that, as Petty and Cacioppo (1990) have claimed, a wealth of 
concepts can be made available to subjects if they have a stake in the 
situation (whether value- or outcome-relevant). 
Our data also reinforce Petty and Cacioppo’s (1990) point that, at high 
levels of involvement, other elements of the persuasion setting (like ar- 
gument strength) determine persuasion by creating processing biases. Fig- 
ure 5 is illustrative. It shows just the attitude scale results for the argument 
strength x involvement interaction for the unwarned-undistracted con- 
ditions of Experiment 2. This figure very closely follows that of Petty and 
Cacioppo (1986, 1990) for unfavorably biased processing. 
As we said at the outset, and as our findings confirm, forewarning 
situations can be quite complex. However, as we and other investigators 
have tried to demonstrate, forewarning adds something “special” to per- 
suasion settings that goes beyond the specifics of forewarning itself; it 
informs us about key cognitive and motivational processes and ways these 
kinds of processes interact. 
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